

Asymmetric Warfare

Conflict of the Past,
the Present, and the Future

Conference Conclusions



ÁLMOSS PÉTER KISS (ed.)



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ASYMMETRIC WARFARE

Conflict of the Past, the Present, and the Future
Budapest, Hungary, 9–10 November 2016

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Conference Rationale

Sober prognoses predict that the changes that have occurred in the character of armed conflict since the end of World War II are not likely to be reversed any time soon. Conflict between states and non-state actors shall remain the dominant form of warfare, but the existential threat of high-intensity international “conventional” war shall also be present. Therefore, the state’s security forces must be ready to answer two disparate violent challenges – often at the same time.

The scientific research center of the Hungarian Defence Forces General Staff, in collaboration with the National University of Public Service, organized the conference to discuss some of the controversial issues that arise from this state of affairs. The Public Service Development Establishing Good Governance project (PADOP-2.1.2-CCHOP-15-2016-00001) provided partial funding. The conference attracted military and law-enforcement professionals, public administration specialists and academic researchers in various disciplines. The participation of young officers and academic researchers at the beginning of their career contributed to the “outside the box” thinking.

In order to provide a framework for the conference, the organizers posed a series of questions at the outset:

- What are the social, economic, political, security and other factors that assist the non-state belligerent to succeed, and hinder the state to address the asymmetric challenge?
- How can the instruments of state power be deployed to reverse this trend, and what are the metrics of success or failure?
- How can the law of armed conflict, international criminal law and national laws be applied in an asymmetric conflict?
- What is the appropriate balance of political, economic, communication, administrative, law enforcement and military responses?
- How can society’s resilience and resistance to asymmetric challenges be enhanced? What are the effects of mass migration on the receiving nations’ vulnerability to asymmetric challenges?
- Asymmetric warfare in the service of the state.
- What is the role of strategic communication in an asymmetric conflict?
- What role do the international community, allies, NGOs and human rights organizations play in an asymmetric conflict?
- Since a disparity of force is part of every conflict, is the term “asymmetric warfare” appropriate at all? Does creating such categories and sub-categories of conflict as terrorism, insurgency, guerrilla war, asymmetric warfare, irregular warfare, unconventional warfare, asymmetric war, hybrid war, conventional war, and nation building contribute to, or detract from, understanding the problem and finding answers?

Conference Conclusions and Recommendations

The presentations, as well as the subsequent discussions addressed some of the questions posed by the organizers, and also raised new ones. A general sense of the conference was that the ideology of political correctness severely hampers meaningful discourse. For example, the doctrine of the desirability of open immigration and multiculturalism should not be an unchallenged dogma: it needs to be tested against evidence, not against imposed standards of acceptable public discourse. Similarly, discussion of the role of religion in violent extremism must not be taboo.

The following paragraphs summarize the conclusions of the conference, and include some recommendations for policy makers (the paragraphs' sequence does not necessarily imply an order of importance).

General Policy Recommendations

- There is no one-size-fits-all solution to the violent challenge posed by non-state actors. Every country and every situation is different, and threats are location-specific. Therefore, solutions must also be location-specific.
- Resource-constraints are a fact of life for every government today. They hamper the government's ability to deliver security to the people, and they help the adversary, whose operations are generally low-cost. To get optimal benefit from the available resources, the responses to the asymmetric challenges must be appropriately prioritized.
- Work pro-actively in conflict regions, and prevent/reduce conflicts before they get out of control. In a broader sense, a pro-active approach both to international and to internal disputes is more important today than ever before. This implies/requires building partnerships with civilizationally allied powers, even if differences on peripheral issues may exist.
- On the ideological front, adopt the Roman doctrine of divide and conquer.
- Emphasize the fact that terrorism is both a security issue and a law-enforcement issue. This understanding should be integrated into policy through strengthening institutional links between law-enforcement and internal security organizations, facilitate the sharing of databases, and the creation of ad hoc C3I centers.
- The incorporation of industry and business experience/practices as appropriate, as well as red-teaming may provide invaluable tools in policy formulation. Reservists, with their less career-oriented perspective, may also make valuable contributions to policy.

- Conventional war's definitions of success and failure, victory and defeat, and goals and objectives are not applicable to asymmetric conflict. They must be defined (or re-defined) according to the specific conditions and situation.
- Think not just outside the box, but beyond the box, and get rid of the box altogether when circumstances warrant.
- Clearly identify who is who in the conflict, and be clear who the enemy is and what his true intentions are. Adversaries are not necessarily enemies. A wary neutrality may be possible with the first, while the second must be actively opposed. In a similar vein, allies and potential allies are not necessarily friends.
- Consider restructuring the military to deal with the current threat. The imperative for this comes from outside. Restructuring implies equipment as well: the security forces need weapons and tools to fit the fight (e.g. robots, EMT), rather than fight in a manner that fits the available weapons. On the other hand, it is easy to be dazzled by technology, but it is not a magic solution: the focus should be on "right-tech," instead of "high-tech."


Strategic and Operational Issues

- Conventional warfare has a role to play in combatting asymmetric challenges. However, the tactical victories the armed forces achieve do not matter much without appropriate strategy, which must be based on a whole-of-government – whole-of-society approach to security, and incorporate appropriate communication to the population.
- Protecting everything and everyone from the threat inherent in the asymmetric challenge is an impossible undertaking. Instead, accept a certain degree of risk to life and property, as the price of freedom, and adopt a doctrine of "acceptable losses." Protect vital infrastructure and harden significant targets where such measures are cost-effective. Train the population in vigilance, and adequately fund local law enforcement agencies.
- Take the fight to the enemy, because success in a conflict can rarely be achieved by defensive action alone. Identify potential incubators of terrorism/other asymmetric threats and surgically mitigate or disrupt them.
- Innovation is not just an important factor in asymmetric conflicts. Rather, it is one of the drivers for both the state and the non-state belligerent. In order to succeed, innovation – technological, doctrinal, legal and cultural – must become an integral part of the planning process.
- Relearning time after time the lessons of fighting asymmetric adversaries is costly in terms of both blood and treasure. Recognize the importance of history and lessons learned in creating policy. Conduct more research on best practices of other nations, discover what works, what does not – even if the source of lessons is a politically incorrect conflict (colonial war) or system of governance (totalitarian dictatorship).
- The enemy is NOT obliged to fight in a specific way, so rely on good intelligence and avoid mirror imaging, when making assumptions about his likely course of action.

- Control of territory is as important in asymmetric conflicts as in conventional wars, but the characteristics of control are different.

Initial Response

Operationalizing the initial response to the asymmetric challenge is usually quite difficult. The following quadrant diagram may serve as a conceptual framework, a directional marker for further research, and even as a rough initial planning tool, for the initial period of an asymmetric confrontation, from the time it is identified as a potential challenge to the state's authority, until it develops into a violent confrontation.



Legal Issues

The Westphalian international order is fading: it is difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile recent developments in international law (e.g. the doctrine of the responsibility to protect) with unquestioned state sovereignty. On the other hand, international humanitarian law has not kept pace with developments in armed conflict: its precepts are often ignored or intentionally transgressed by the belligerents.

- Policy makers must understand the expanded role international law can play as instrument of war today. They must realize that territory may be lost or gained not only by war, but also by law. Additionally, they must develop strategies that neutralize disruptive litigation – a favorite instrument of some non-state actors.

- Recent developments in warfare, as well as recently developed legal doctrines may necessitate changes in international law and international humanitarian law. However, the process of developing those changes must not be a hasty one, lest the results turn out worse than the original problem and be unacceptable to public opinion.

Communication

At present the state is far behind the non-state actors when it comes to using internet communication resources, especially social media. The rare instances where the state is successful in this area are usually due to the initiative of individual officials, rather than a result of a coherent strategic communication policy.

- The state cannot afford to surrender cyberspace to the non-state actors. Its communication must become pro-active, rather than reactive, and it must counter the adversary's propaganda.
- As a first step, the state should establish an initial – but permanent – presence in social media and other internet communication channels, and expand its cyberspace communications gradually, as its specialists gain experience.
- Make strategic communication a part of the planning process, and not just an ad hoc response.
- Think of the message first, and adapt the tools to the message. Use media and ICT as a force multiplier, and empower specialists to respond in real time and circumvent hierarchies.

Violent Jihad, Migration and Terrorism

Most religions have some undercurrents of violence-prone extremism. Today none can match the adherents of the Islamist jihad movement for ideological commitment and readiness for violence. Violent jihad, sustained by uncontrolled mass migration, is the primary security threat to the western world today.

As recent experience in various European states has shown, uncontrolled mass migration is not only a security challenge, but also rends the fabric of the host society. In many cases current immigration policies obstruct, rather than help law-enforcement identify individuals in the migration flow who pose a security threat. One of the most effective law-enforcement tools in identifying potential security threats is profiling. However, its use is discouraged in some states, and forbidden outright in others on ideological grounds.

- Treat extremist activism (e.g. Islamists' drive to replace the law of the land with the sharia) as subversive political activity, rather than legitimate religious advocacy and make it legal grounds for exclusion or deportation.
- Review immigration policies and terminate or reverse those that increase domestic threats, undermine cultural and political coherence, and strain economic resources.
- Articulate and pursue policies contributing to cultural coherence of society. Accept/welcome those who are prepared to adapt to the host society's norms, and exclude those who refuse to do so.

- Discard the ban on profiling.
- Actively and preventively engage neighboring nations and local population on migration issues.
- In providing security, creating a physical barrier (wall, security fence, and buffer zone) is an option of proven efficiency.

A Question of Terminology

In the past three to five decades a large number of expressions have been invented to describe a type of conflict in which a state's regular forces clash with either the forces of non-state belligerents, or with the less-regular forces of another state. Low intensity conflict, military operations other than war, modern war, asymmetric conflict, hybrid warfare, unrestricted warfare are just a few. Since they mean different things to different people, they serve more to confuse the issue than to clarify it.

- A working definition of asymmetric warfare was suggested at the conference:
 - *disparity in numbers, material resources or warfighting ability does not make a conflict asymmetric;*
 - *the conflict is between disparate warfighting cultures;*
 - *the belligerents have disparate legal status: one is an internationally recognized state, the other is a non-state actor;*
 - *generally there is a disparity in the belligerents' value systems and theories of victory;*
 - *the non-state actor's strategic goals are not attainable either through peaceful political process, or by means of conventional warfare.*
- A recommendation was made to abandon the term altogether, along with all similar, imprecise terms, and rather than trying to subdivide warfare and pigeon-hole the parts according to the adversary's uniform (or lack thereof), treat it as a continuum. Making a distinction between conventional interstate war and the conflict at hand is still necessary. The definitions thus developed can be refined, replaced or discarded, as the conflict develops.

Summaries of Opening Addresses and Keynote Addresses

Opening Address by TAMÁS VARGHA, Deputy Minister of Defence, Hungary

General George S. Patton said at one time, that “if everyone is thinking alike, then somebody isn’t thinking.” Looking at the disparate background of the speakers (policemen, military officers, civil servants, academics), as well as the titles of the presentations, this conference would satisfy the American general.

Asymmetric warfare is not a new phenomenon at all, but it is the dominant form of armed conflict today, and the security forces of the various nations must study it, and prepare for waging it. The unprecedented mass migration to Europe from Africa and Asia also necessitate a close and realistic study of asymmetric challenges, especially one of their most important aspects: information superiority.

Handling the challenges posed by mass migration is crucially important at the level of the European Union as well, since even larger waves of migration are expected in the future, and the problem is not likely to be solved any time soon – since the solution must be sought in the countries where the migrants come from. The Hungarian government was the first to recognize the dangers inherent in uncontrolled migration and took the necessary steps.

Stability of the European region is important for us, and this conference will likely contribute to our understanding and provide some insights into resolving this problem. However, the real importance of the conference lies even more in the debates that should follow the presentations, and in the conclusions and recommendations that will be the output of the second day.

Therefore, all speakers, as well as the other participants are encouraged to contribute their knowledge, experience and opinion, in order to enhance our knowledge and our ability to answer the asymmetric challenges of the future.

Opening Address by LtGen ZOLTÁN OROSZ, Deputy Chief of Staff, Hungarian Defence Forces

Considering the dynamic changes of the security relationships of the 21st century, it is essential that experts familiar with the problem of asymmetric conflict should meet and formulate ideas that may serve the Hungarian Defence Forces, as well as the international community.

As the Deputy Minister of Defense has quoted General Patton, “if everyone is thinking alike, then somebody isn’t thinking.” This quote is not only a legitimization of scientific research, but also a summary of the key drivers of the security challenges of the 21st century.

The asymmetric threats that arise in an increasing number of regions, as well as the attacks on security systems have one purpose: to exploit the shortcomings of the defense structures, and transfer power into the hands of a new political and economic leadership. The significance of the challenge lies in the fact that it is unpredictable and cannot be countered through traditional defense planning.

The ideology of those waging asymmetric warfare overwrites not only the interests of individual nations, but also questions values that have been generally considered universal. Their activities are often combined with complex economic, political and social embeddedness and sophisticated strategic background. Considering their intensive propaganda and adaptive ideology, we cannot afford to neglect our own strategic planning and scientific research activities.

The complexity of the challenges to our security systems requires that we continuously adjust our operational and strategic goals to the security threats. Adaptation to the changing security environment requires fast and well-founded decisions, which, in turn, require timely and accurate information, as well as constant strategic analysis and research, and the development of new perspectives. So, the time has again come to review our security strategy.

I encourage the participants of the conference to engage in active debate, and think outside the box. While we must observe national and international laws, we must also divorce ourselves from predictable, obsolete and simplistic defense patterns. In our graduated defense responses we cannot afford to leave such loopholes as would jeopardize our country's or the international community's interests.

The series of presentation today, as well as the workshop tomorrow can give a new impetus to building new competences into defense structures and contribute to successful strategic planning. I expect that both during the conference, and in the subsequent conference proceedings the conclusions and recommendations will contribute to Hungary's long-term security.

Keynote Address by BG IMRE PORKOLÁB, Hungarian Defence Forces

Throughout the ages there have been two very distinct warfighting cultures (the traditional and the irregular) based on entirely disparate mindsets that bring entirely different approaches to warfare. Traditional warfighting culture is either based on annihilation or maneuver – either seeking decisive battles to eliminate the enemy's army using mainly firepower or seeking out the enemy's weaknesses and exploiting opportunities in order to create favorable conditions for success. Irregular warfighting culture is either guerrilla warfare (most often used by rebels, freedom fighters and overall by non-traditional warfighters, who are fighting against traditional armies or legitimate governments in order to gain legitimacy and power), or terrorism – a very much debated and poorly defined phenomenon. We can talk about asymmetric warfare when two different warfighting cultures collide.

Both warfighting cultures have developed over time to assume their current characteristics. Traditional warfare progressed from the linear tactics and formal battles of the 17th century through the massed firepower of the early 20th to the late 20th and early 21st century speed, surprise and dislocation. Irregular warfare went through a similar progression from

a strategy of evasion and exhaustion through people's war and urban guerrilla warfare to terrorism.

In the past there were instances of clashes and overlaps between the mindsets that are the foundations of the two warfighting cultures, but today we are experiencing their unprecedented integration. One of the cornerstones of traditional warfare, the nation state's near monopoly on combat forces is in decline, and as a result pre-modern modes of conflict – and with them a proliferation of irregular belligerents – are reappearing.

The number of players has also increased significantly. Traditional militaries now have to take into account not just enemy forces, but a plethora of irregular organizations (guerrillas, terrorists, organized crime groups as well). There is an increasing number of private military contractors, NGOs and International Organizations as well that also play a huge part in the outcome of a conflict. These players (due to technological advances) are more interconnected than ever; the connections between them have increased exponentially. This creates a very complex operating environment with constantly shifting interests and alliances. The context is best described by the acronym VUCA (developed by the U.S. Army War College in the late 1990s): volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous.

In the contemporary environment, where pressure on people to accommodate to new, unfamiliar settings is almost constant, where the magnitude of change is accelerating and the very nature of how to manage change is transforming, the salient question on every leader's mind is the following: if the traditional way of leading through change is no longer valid, what will take its place? What strategies are best suited to deal with future challenges? What are the possible alternatives?

Integration of the two mindsets, combining irregular and traditional leadership approaches may be the most appropriate answer to today's challenges. It results in a hybrid organization and in fact it is very effective in an uncertain, complex context. This integration is a transformation process, which requires a lot of trial and error, acceptance of risk and an open and transparent methodology to help people within an organization drive through the changes ahead and become nimble.

Nimbleness is the ability for an organization to consistently succeed in unpredictable, contested environments by implementing important changes more efficiently and effectively than its competitors. Leadership has a threefold role in creating a nimble organization: it must ensure that the organization is an open system; take steps to increase absorption limits; and constantly press the limits for this envelope of boundaries by introducing as many important changes as possible without overextending available adaptation resources.

Being nimble is not a static position. You constantly need to calibrate the agility needed to maintain the edge over competitors and the context. The real competitive advantage is to have a nimble response to the next generation of needs that are not yet known. You have to treat the ability to manage the unexpected as a strategic asset.

In order to succeed with such a transformation effort one needs the 'right' kind of mindset (people with the attitude to translate the desired vision into reality and operationalize the goal). Organizations must also place an emphasis on building resiliency in people who are positive and can succeed in unfamiliar circumstances. They remain focused on objectives during times of confusion, exhibit flexibility about how to address inhibitors, find order in a seemingly chaotic situation and proactively embrace change rather than running from it.

They may become tired, but recover quickly and gain expanded capacity to absorb even more change in the future.

Organizations as a whole must be highly resilient as well. It does not just mean that they regain equilibrium quickly after the disruption of change or make sure that its people are physically and emotionally healthy. They must also develop and maintain system operations despite high levels of stress. In order to implement a transformational process at the organizational level the leadership must be role models and embrace the concept wholeheartedly, monitor the context constantly and build a continuous strategic awareness, and finally pay attention to developing an organizational culture with identified beliefs, behaviors and assumptions.

It is not an easy process, but a necessary one, a journey that has to be undertaken in order to survive what is yet to come.

Keynote Address by RAPHAEL C. PERL, Executive Director, NATO Partnership for Peace Consortium

Asymmetric warfare is not new. Neither is the use of migration and perpetuation of refugees as a tool of warfare. What is new, however, is the global impact of local conflicts, in a world that is increasingly linked by the free movement of people, goods, money, and information. The proliferation of new technologies and their widespread availability to the man in the street and a trend in decentralization of power from nation states to networks and individuals. And what is also relatively new is the concept of western democracies with their concepts of individual freedom, human rights and legal protections afforded even to those who are involved in the asymmetric challenge to the state's authority.

A common failure in today's mainstream thinking is the belief that asymmetric warfare can be stopped by conventional warfare. This is not to say that we do not need strong conventional forces and capabilities—the threat from nation states remains ever present. Moreover, in many ways, conventional warfare can mitigate asymmetric strategies and tactics by adversaries.

One used to know when wars were over, but today the war is over when the people – and not the government – say the war is over. Without decisive victories, asymmetric conflicts tend to drag on and become processes that are self-perpetuating. This is partly due to the fact that peace and nonviolence are not always shared values and goals. In negotiations we may seek peace as an outcome, but our adversaries may regard our desire for peace as a confirmation of weakness. Their long-term plan, may be conquest through violence—or simply to inflict damage justified by longstanding precepts such as honor and revenge.

To narrow the perspective to a current major source of concern to all of us – transnational asymmetric terrorism (TAT) – we must dispense with a dangerous misconception. Since transnational asymmetric terrorism occurs only intermittently, many believe that it is possible to defend against it completely or even relatively completely. Such thinking is flawed. It is an illusion to think we can protect everything, everywhere, all the time.

The dilemma is that in a world where power and access to weaponry are increasingly decentralized, the demands of citizenry for governments to provide security is growing. Because threats can come from so many unexpected sources, when attempting to provide se-

curity today, governments need to cast wider and wider nets for information gathering – and the abuse of such information is practically guaranteed. This poses a major challenge to the concepts of individual liberty and democracy.

One option when responding to TAT would be to adopt a doctrine of ‘acceptable losses’. Inherent in the price of freedom is acceptance of a certain degree of risk to life and property. This is not capitulation to terrorism. On the contrary, all reasonable means available should be used to mitigate transnational asymmetric threats. Major policy issues involved in adopting such an approach center on maintaining cost-effectiveness and preserving of civil liberties.

Terrorists need banks, money launderers, and weapons suppliers. They need societies or subcultures that support their goals. Once the process of terrorism takes hold in a widespread fashion, concerted efforts against it are often too late, are very expensive and generally have limited effectiveness without global consensus on elimination of the problem. That level of consensus is very difficult to obtain.

Consequently, a doctrine of “acceptable losses” is applicable to our times. Protect vital infrastructure, both physical and cyber. Harden other significant targets where such measures are cost-effective. Train the population in vigilance and provide convenient ways for people to report suspicious activity. Adequately fund local law enforcement agencies and federal backup teams. Identify potential incubators of terrorism and surgically mitigate or disrupt them. Provide commercial or federally backed terrorism insurance, similar to flood insurance or other programs, to cover damages and casualties from terrorist acts or other asymmetric attacks.

Current commercial insurance policies often do not cover terrorism. This needs to change.

So what should we do to mitigate transnational asymmetric terrorism?

Here are some suggestions with room for an active role for the military if desired.

1. Implement a doctrine of “acceptable losses” and stop spending unnecessarily on countermeasures beyond the limit of cost-effectiveness.
2. Promote contingency planning at all levels of government.
3. Encourage the establishment and regular testing of emergency communications methods.
4. Identify, contain and neutralize sources that actively promote and export violent extremism.
5. Educate populations in vigilance and encourage reporting of suspicious activities.
6. Reformulate economic planning to increase resiliency.
7. Form specialized coalitions with partners – even unlikely ones – with shared interests in combating transnational asymmetric terrorism.
8. Keep the military engaged, not only in its traditional duties and support to law enforcement, but also in refugee management and health emergency operations.
9. The military should adapt and mirror the organizational and operational structures of the adversary and take the fight to those who physically threaten our security and way of life.

It is time to stop talking about solutions and start implementing them. More than a decade after the attacks of September 11, 2001, we still do not have a consensus on what constitutes

transnational asymmetric terrorism and how to measure the effectiveness of our defensive and offensive actions against the enemy. It is a situation that demands proactive policies, not frenzied second-guessing about attacks in hindsight with later implementation of policies that may have worked to defend against the previous attack but will not work to stop the next one.

We know that certain safeguards have helped such as intelligence gathering, document security, monitoring of travel to regions where terror is incubated, monitoring of paths of funding, and political and military cooperation with partners. Notwithstanding, these are partial measures at best. What we arguably need are fundamental realignments of governmental and societal priorities.

Abstracts of Presentations

PETER BALOGH (Hungary): Cooperation – Multiplying the Destructive Potential of Asymmetric Threats

The presentation introduces results from research on the social dimension of violence. It concentrates on how new types of attacks against society emerge, and what innovative forms of organizing and implementing aggression evolve. Findings suggest that *social relations and embeddedness* play a crucial role in perceiving and interpreting the success of non-state aggressors in recent years.

Both aspects of embeddedness are addressed. On the one hand a basically micro-sociological interpretation of individual terrorist attacks is offered: the events presented by the media as individual terrorist acts may be better understood as a special mixture of individual and structural factors of aggression. The attacks can be described as *aggression based on tertiary group affiliation*: the conjunction of personal motivations and virtual group membership (without direct personal links) or identification. The simultaneous presence of the individual factor of negative emotions *and* the structural factor of hate speech promoting aggression support the realization of aggression. On the other hand, empirical findings are also presented on the role of *cooperation as a key factor of success* on the global terrorism market.

Terrorist attacks carried out by several actors in partnership are investigated, in order to

1. show the evolution and the temporal and regional diffusion of joint terrorist attacks,
2. map the global network of the groups embedded through this special kind of collaborative terrorism,
3. identify the main characteristics of the cooperation structure,
4. identify the dominant actors of the global terrorism network, paying particular attention to the actor recently considered to be the most dangerous one; ISIS,
5. demonstrate – based on various ‘success’ indicators – how collaboration multiplies the destructive force of cooperative terrorist organizations.

The research is based on both qualitative (content analysis) and quantitative (secondary statistical data analysis) methods. Data analysis relies on basic descriptive methods, statistical multivariable explanatory models, as well as quantitative and graphical procedures of social network analysis.

As a concluding remark ‘*tertiary group affiliation based aggression*’ may be offered to interpret the recent individual terrorist attacks. According to preliminary research results, terrorism in the last two decades became globally embedded through a cooperative

network of terrorist attacks and collaboration proves to be advantageous for the organizations involved.

ERIK BERNATH (Hungary): Countering Hybrid Warfare with Civilian-Based Nonviolent Defense and Resistance

In June 2016, the Polish government announced a plan to recruit 35,000 volunteers for a militia. At the same time, growing numbers of Poles are joining volunteer paramilitary groups to get basic military training and prepare to defend their homeland from a possible Russian invasion. Over a year earlier, in January 2015, the Lithuanian Ministry of Defense published a manual instructing the citizens on how to survive a Russian invasion, and to resist occupation with demonstrations and strikes: “Citizens can resist aggression against their country not only through armed struggle. Civilian-based defense or nonviolent civil resistance is another way for citizens’ resistance against aggression.”

These examples show two different approaches to defense measures taken in case of a foreign invasion. The question is which of them has more relevance in case of hybrid warfare. The approach advocated in the Lithuanian manual forms the theme of this presentation: understanding of the limitations inherent in an armed response, and the realization of the potential of nonviolent defense and resistance in countering hybrid warfare. Ukraine may be a case in point. In response to a Russian hybrid challenge, the government launched a counterinsurgency operation. The results were costly: an increased presence of Russian troops; over 6000 people dead, and more than 1 million people internally displaced. It seems that Ukraine would have been better served by an approach similar to that outlined in the Lithuanian manual.

Russia itself has used civilian-based nonviolent actions in Ukraine and made them integral part of its military doctrine. As a counter-measure NATO and its member states also should give a serious consideration to the idea of employing these strategies, because they offer serious advantages over traditional military strategies by exploiting the political vulnerabilities of the enemy.

Civilian-based defense policies can be developed, oppression can be prevented or mitigated by nonviolent resistance. Massive noncooperation and defiance can deny the attackers their objectives, prevent the establishment of effective control over the defending society, while minimizing costs for the country under attack. Furthermore, a civilian-based nonviolent defense and resistance movement can instill a significant degree of civic empowerment, self-organization, decentralization, and civic solidarity elements into any society.

ROBERT C. CASTEL (Israel): Give Victory a Chance – Applying Innovation Theories to Asymmetric Warfare

This paper argues for the unchanged and fundamental need of seeking victory over our asymmetric adversaries. The existing Clausewitzian concept of victory is clearly outdated and this paper – taking Israel’s current security challenges as its case study – seeks to re-define victory at two levels: a) the desired end-state and b) the strategies used to achieve it.

The importance of this paper is twofold. First it offers a brief critique of Israel's past and present national security doctrines. Second, its insights may be instructive for other Western nations facing similar challenges in a not too distant future.

The research questions this paper tackles are:

1. What are our theories of victory, and what are the strategies used to achieve them?
2. Why are both of these counterproductive today?
3. What new distinctions are needed in order to understand what adversaries we are facing today?
4. What should be our new theory of victory and what strategies should be deployed in order to achieve it?

The answers suggest that the existing doctrines of deterrence, early warning and military decision were relevant to past wars, but are much less relevant today. They are a surefire way of winning all the battles and losing the war. The distinction between "real" security, i.e. war against conventional armies, and "current security" i.e. fighting against non-state adversaries, is hopelessly obsolete. The disappearance of conventional threats on the one hand, and the emergence of non-conventional and hybrid ones on the other, require new distinctions. The strategic wisdom of economizing in adversaries points in the same direction.

"Postmodern war," defined by an ongoing conflict, hybrid threats, non-state adversaries, the influence of public opinion, media-transparency and the "owning of the conflict" by the international community demands combined victories in at least three theaters: the military, the diplomatic and the home front. Victory is the result of careful and delicate exercise of state-power in all three of these theatres. Excessive use of leverage in one of these may be self-defeating in the others and in the war as a whole. With the changing character of war the poles may have changed, but the Clausewitzian dictum is still relevant today: "Our task ... is to develop a theory that maintains a balance between these three tendencies, like an object suspended between three magnets."

GÁBOR CSEHI (Hungary): Asymmetric Warfare and Health with a Special Focus on Bioterrorism

As Western societies are very sensitive to losses, both the people and governments react very sensitively to the losses of lives. Our enemies also know this: the terrorist attacks of 9/11, Madrid, London or the recent ones in France, even the events in Iraq and Afghanistan prove this. Even in particularly asymmetric situations, lacking technical, financial or human resources, it is possible to cause painful losses to the enemy and boost the effect by effectively communicating the attacks in the social media. This was one reason for the robust healthcare network the allies built in Iraq and Afghanistan. If an allied soldier was not killed in action outright, he received very high quality medical help in a very short time, and usually survived.

The fate of the wounded in combat or any other mass injury situation depends on the timeliness and quality of treatment. The so-called "golden hour" serves as an efficiency indicator for the organization providing the treatment: the healthcare system is able to administer the first medical aid within an hour and also provide the immediately necessary

special operations in some forms. Trained medical personnel on the spot and air evacuation make it possible.

In asymmetric warfare the number of medical casualties is not as high as it would have been in the major theatres of the Cold War era. The regulations and protocols of the medical treatments are in accordance with the peace-time treatment, demanding continuous improvement and meeting everyday challenges. This change in volume of medical treatment is one of the important experiences of the asymmetric wars. The main focus is not on the mass treatment but the high-level treatment which saves the lives and provides the highest possible quality of living later.

The healthcare system of the hinterland is also changing accordingly. Our country (Hungary) is not prepared to deploy a field hospital to support military operations. Nor the civilian healthcare system is able to provide this kind of help, it is scaled (and financed) to cover normal needs and demands. This also means a certain vulnerability, since the casualties of a large-scale terrorist attack could overwhelm the capacities of the system. An attack generating at least 100 heavily injured people or a similar number of special treatment needs (contagious, victims of chemical or radioactive situations) would fit this category.

To reduce this vulnerability both the civilian and military healthcare systems have to be prepared for the tasks and challenges of asymmetric warfare. These two systems should not be (and cannot be) used for the same tasks, however, a close cooperation is necessary to minimize the losses and to provide the highest level of possible professional treatments. It can also have a positive effect on the costs since the treatment needs of an injured limb is very similar in the case of a bomb explosion or a traffic accident. The installed capacity of one system can be used in the other.

So far the Western nations have been attacked only by traditional weaponry (explosives, firearms), probably because of their relative cheapness and availability. However, other types of future attacks (biological, chemical, radionuclear) cannot be excluded. Installing and keeping prevention and reaction capacities against these possible threats can be key parts of the future asymmetric conflicts. For example, a successful bioterrorist attack could have a devastating and demoralizing effect. It is necessary to identify the means and steps to prevent or at least reduce these negative effects.

PETER DELY (Hungary): Terrorism in the Western World – or Warfare versus Law Enforcement

The focus of this presentation is the premise that a paradigm shift in the regulations of counter-terrorism law enforcement units is required: counter-terrorism should be regarded as an asymmetric warfare operation, rather than as a law enforcement task. In the Global War on Terror states and international organizations fight terrorist organizations and their support structures. They set up doctrines and introduce new tactics, techniques and procedures based on theoretical research. However, on a state level counter-terrorism is usually the task of the law enforcement organizations and nowadays the question arises: are the security forces, constrained as they are by legal controls, suitable for dealing with the situation?

The essence of the problem surfaces in the event of a violent, life threatening and frequently suicidal attack: in these situations, the average police responses are not effective.

Military tactics are more effective against terrorism, however, their employment is generally not allowed by the laws that govern law enforcement. Nevertheless, the international tendency is that democratic states are drifting in the direction of military style solutions to terrorism, because effective counter-terrorist action demands such military tactics and tools as covering fire, anti-material rifles and chemical weapons.

There are modern, well-equipped and trained anti-terrorism units in every European country, mostly as part of the police forces. However, if the actual CT contact is not the result of an intelligence-lead, planned action, in most cases it is not the police special units, but the general police who make first contact with the terrorists. And the response of these police units, constrained by a legal framework, does not produce the desired result. Police CT procedures are based on Christian-European values of life, assuming that the perpetrators will choose surrender in desperate/hopeless situations. However, most of these police tactics – elaborated for the protection of human life – are inefficient against fundamentalist terrorists who are prepared for the final sacrifice, thus the proper solution from law enforcement is the immediate and accurate application of the necessary level of force. The rules on the use of force must be reconsidered, since in such cases force cannot be the last resort, as traditional police SOP requires. The use of force must be equal to the threat, and must be used at the moment when it is effective, and productive. The adaptation of the network centric operation management would also be essential, as would the full separation of counter-terrorism from the system of community policing/traditional law enforcement.

TAMÁS DUDLÁK (Hungary): Network and Countermeasures – Two Years of IS Activity in Turkey

Since 2013 the Islamic State has been controlling large areas in the vicinity of Turkey creating a challenging situation along the Syrian–Iraqi border. Therefore, it is essential to understand the complex nature of ISIS's interests and motivations in Turkey by concentrating on its activity of the last two years. Although the Islamic State considers itself a state, the situation cannot be palpable within the traditional framework of state-to-state relations thus making the fight between ISIS and Turkey asymmetric.

The method of the research is based on the qualitative analysis of English and Turkish literature on Turkey and ISIS. Reports, case studies, newspaper articles and books help me conduct my research based on the observation of realist school of international relations and emphasizing the importance of security studies, but not denying the role of normative ideas in foreign and domestic policy.

In the presentation, I plan to show the network of ISIS in Turkey and how it is perceived by the Turkish government. The approach to the Islamic State in Turkey's political decisions is constrained by some of the principles of Turkish foreign policy. First, the rising importance of Kurds must be hindered both home and abroad by refusing their claim for independence. Second, Turkey is interested in the degradation of radical ideologies and terrorist activities in the Middle East. Turkey cannot cope with the ISIS alone, the idea of comprehensive intervention against the terrorist organization right now is not possible, therefore Turkey tries to contain the challenge and stabilize the situation. Third, Turkey has the largest migrant population in the world and therefore has an interest in controlling

the flow of migrants and decreasing the intensity of any conflict. Fourth, the main aim of the Turkish foreign policy in Syria is to overthrow the Syrian government of Assad and it remained so even after the emergence of the Islamic state.

The main accusation is concerned with Turkey's non-interventionist policy in Syria (until 24 August 2016) and hindering the fight against the Islamic State. Moreover, there are reports on cooperation between the Islamic State and the Turkish Intelligence Agency (MIT) and smuggling arms, oil and fighters through the border of Turkey. Indeed, the south-eastern border of Turkey is fluid and exposed to terrorist networks and intensive border trafficking. Turkey is considered as the main supply line of the Caliphate and often labelled as a "jihadist highway" enabling the foreign fighters to make contact with the Islamic State. In spite of these allegations, Turkey formed its policy toward the Islamic State according to the above-mentioned interests, but the complex political, economic, societal and religious conditions of the Syrian–Iraqi crisis area often overrode the theoretical simplicity of those principles.

Last year, the anti-terrorist measures within Turkey were boosted by the resurgent suicide bombing attacks inside the country caused both by the Kurdish separatists (PKK) and the network of the Islamic State. Several domestic security operations were made against different terrorist cells coming from abroad, but it is still a challenging multidimensional task for the security forces and the intelligence to take efficient countermeasures and not to provoke ISIS further escalating the conflict.

Nevertheless, it is the responsibility of Turkey to secure its south-eastern border and if need be, make it possible for the NATO allies to cooperate in closing the borders of the Syrian–Iraqi crisis area. It is of utmost importance for Turkey to hinder mobilization of foreign terrorist fighters even more efficiently (e.g. by cutting the financial sources of terrorism) and take extensive anti-radicalization measures all over the country. The analysis of the relations with the Islamic State contributes to the better understanding of Turkish counterterrorist measures and shed light on the challenges of south-eastern borderline territories of the Turkish Republic.

SÁNDOR FÁBIÁN (Hungary): To Reform or Not to Reform – That Must Not Be the Question

Asymmetric warfare means so many different things to so many people, it easily loses its usefulness. Many scholars have attempted to define the term and its meaning without success. "The U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute commissioned a three-year-long effort to grapple with the term and its implications. Yet, due to a lack of concrete understanding, the term became meaningless." (David L. Buffalo) Furthermore, "the establishment of a doctrinal definition for asymmetric warfare would 'likely prove ambiguous at best and confusing at worst'." (LtGen John M. Currin) So, if asymmetric warfare is not the term for understanding the present and future challenges nations are facing than what should guide their preparation for future conflicts?

What the world should witness is a fundamental shift from the current conventionally focused defensive approaches to unconventional national strategies. First, nations should understand that their traditional understanding of security and defense, and the organizations serving it are not working anymore. They should consider the introduction of an

“unrestricted” or “total” war-like national defense strategy. Second, in their new approach, countries should break down the decades-old (in some cases hundreds of years-old) military culture and traditions. Just like the phalanx, the heavy cavalry, and the hussars (and the weapon systems associated with these formations) vanished hundreds of years ago, the existing services, branches, formations and the military rank system should disappear. New formations should be employed with completely unexpected techniques, tactics, and procedures to defeat both conventional and unconventional adversaries. Third, nations should move away from pursuing a high-tech to a “right-tech” approach. Countries should understand that they cannot buy and sustain the most advanced weapons, and they do not have to. They can free themselves from slavery to technology. The world is at the point in technological development when nations can choose their way of fighting first and then develop the proper hardware in support of it. Instead of trying to compete with a tank against a tank or an airplane against an airplane, a nation’s approach can focus only on technologies that mitigate the advantages of modern systems or make them irrelevant.

YAGIL HENKIN (Israel): Not that New but not that Old - What should be Learned from the Israeli Experience in Fighting Non-State Enemies, and what Should not

Israel has been fighting a conflict of sorts against non-state actors for decades – at least since 1950. The players have changed; the goals have changed; the strategy, of both sides, has changed. Certainly the names we call the phenomenon have changed too (we went through, to name some: retaliation policy, revolutionary warfare, irregular warfare, counter-terrorism, limited conflict, prolonged limited conflict, asymmetric warfare, and it seems that hybrid warfare is gaining some ground recently).

Yet, it seems that each generation of Israeli politicians and military officers seems to be surprised again by the emergence of another kind of irregular warfare.

Since 2000, Israel has been involved – and to a degree, is still involved – in three different separate conflicts: with Hezbollah in Lebanon, with the Palestinians in Judea and Samaria/the West Bank, and with the Palestinians in Gaza – all with their own distinctive character; and ISIS, Jabhat el-Nusra and other gangs in Syria may eventually draw Israel into another conflict.

The Israeli experience shows much about fighting irregular warfare and asymmetrical conflict – both for good and bad. This presentation will attempt to use three cases in order to show the challenges, solutions and shortcomings of different Israeli policies concerning asymmetrical conflict.

Each of those conflicts would be examined from several points:

1. Israeli strategy (or lack thereof);
2. the general concept of the conflict, and its implications;
3. the role of society;
4. the military and its contribution;
5. what was achieved, what wasn’t and why it is relevant.

The summing-up would draw lessons that go beyond the Israeli case, and may be of importance to other countries facing non-state threats.

ZOLTÁN JOBBÁGY (Hungary): Asymmetric Warfare – Evolutionary Roots

An unwanted and long lasting consequence of the demise of the bipolar world order is the increasing number of non-state actors that constantly challenge the existing status quo. Unlike the traditional international environment where states primarily interact with other states, the last two and a half decades witnessed states primarily interacting with various non-state actors. The complexity of the international theatre provides these actors with an abundance of opportunities to become successful even over long periods of time. These state/non-state interactions very often result in asymmetric confrontations, including asymmetric warfare.

Similarities between war and biological evolution are obvious and there are both biologists (Darwin, Cott) and soldiers (Boyd, Lawrence) who either used the vocabularies of the two disciplines interchangeably or explored aspects of the war/evolution overlap in detail. The approach the author proposes to better understand features of asymmetric warfare is biological and takes advantage of recent discoveries in primate research. Aggression and violence are, according to Clausewitz, inherent features of war and can also be found in the intraspecific group aggression of chimpanzees living across Africa. Among chimpanzees most serious attempts at killing are made when the victim is helpless and relatively defenceless, and is little capable of effectively harming the attacker. Thus, there is considerable intraspecific killing in the chimpanzee world that is carried out against the weak and defenceless. The occasions of deadly fighting are asymmetrical: casualties overwhelmingly concentrate on the receiving end. This pattern is remarkably uniform also among humans in the primitive warfare of any society of hunter-gatherers and primitive agriculturalists. It was regularly observed in the asymmetric warfare waged in various areas of operations ranging from Iraq to Afghanistan, too. Raiding chimps and insurgent fighting of non-state actors appear to have similar motivations. Members of both species avoid serious, deadly, face-to-face confrontations to avoid the risk to oneself and to one's close kin. Wounds gained in symmetric confrontations may be dangerous and can reduce the chance of getting to resources to sustain one's living. For chimpanzees there is no social security in nature and wounds might mean starvation, which is also true for humans living in unfortunate parts of the world. The life of raiding chimpanzees and of insurgents is highly insecure and fraught with violent death.

These conditions come very close to what Hobbes described as absolute war in which the meaning of right and wrong, justice and injustice becomes empty. There is no common power, no law and no injustice. Force and fraud go together with continual fear and danger of violent death. In absolute war life is solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short. Conducting raids and fighting from ambushes promote an approach that is essentially defensive. Schmitt called the approach that combines strategic defence with tactical offence telluric. It should not come as a surprise that also Clausewitz, who addressed asymmetric warfare waged by the people only shortly, did this in his book on defence.

PETER A. KISS (Hungary/USA): Militia – an Indispensable Building Block of National Resilience

In asymmetric conflicts the state can prevail only if its security forces can provide security for the population, maintain permanent dominance over the affected regions, and at the same time carry the fight to the non-state belligerent. This requires manpower in very large numbers: troop levels as high as 20 to 25 security forces personnel per 1 000 population (a ratio of 1:50) may be necessary. The security forces are seldom able to establish such comprehensive territorial dominance: they simply do not have the manpower. The two usual ways to increase manpower is to expand the regular forces or to mobilize military-age citizens. Both levy economic and political burdens on society. There is a third way: raising local volunteer self-defense forces (militias), whose members continue to pursue their civilian occupations, and serve part-time in their home towns.

Through several case studies (Hungary, 1956–1989, Punjab 1980–1994, Columbia 1996–2009, Peru 1990–2000, Northern Ireland 1969–2007) the paper examines the advantages that various governments derived from reliance on militias to suppress an asymmetric challenge. The authors' conclusion is that when a militia is under tight control and under adequate leadership, it can make an invaluable contribution to security. It is a constant armed presence that represents the government's authority, as well as an economy-of-force measure: it takes over low-risk, low-skill security tasks from the professional security forces. The militiamen are motivated to maintain security in the vicinity of their homes. They intimately know their areas of responsibility and recognize individuals and conditions that do not fit the normal pattern. As locals and integral parts of the community, they are invaluable both as collectors and as sources of intelligence. A militia can serve as a preventive societal vaccine as well: in areas where militias are organized, a hybrid opponent will find it very difficult to exploit local grievances and recruit supporters. However, there are some risks as well in employing militias: due to their decentralized nature, they can be a source of corruption, and they can turn into undisciplined private armies or worse, if not adequately controlled.

Establishing a militia may be useful even if the asymmetric threat does not materialize. Beyond narrow military considerations (trained personnel that can be mobilized in an emergency) it may have significant social benefits as well. Many citizens would like to serve their community or their nation, but do not feel the call to become long-service, full-time professionals. The militia offers them an opportunity to do more for their country than just pay their taxes and obey the law. Militia service makes the principle of serving the nation, the state and the community a respectable activity – an attitude that tends to fade away soon after the abolition of conscription.

FRANK LEDWIDGE (United Kingdom): Lawfare – Synthesising Law and Insurgency

Law has become a part of modern warfare. Like cyberspace, 'legal space' has become a key battlefield, and combatants are still feeling their way around it. It is not new in nature: at the tactical level – the level at which soldiers operate – the law has long been an environment within which soldiers have had to work.

At the grand strategic level, where debate on the legal aspects of war played a major role in the creation of narrative, no country could afford to be credibly accused (at least after the Second World War) of acting outside the law. However egregiously a country behaved, or indeed behaves, the language of law is used to justify that action. It hardly needs to be said, but it is a worthwhile observation that no country will ever admit to acting outside international law. Law and war, particularly *through* the twentieth century, were intimately intertwined. Questions of law have always infused questions of *ius in bello* and *ius ad bellum*. However, law is now developing a role, again, both at the strategic and at the more granular operational levels.

As David Kennedy puts it: “Law and force flow into one another. We make war in the shadow of law and law in the shadow of force. Law has infiltrated the decisions to make war and crept into the conduct of warfare.”

There is no question that awareness of the potential of the use of law as a weapon is growing. For example, China is said to maintain an entire department of the People’s Liberation Army specializing in the strategic use of law as a weapon, within the framework of the idea of the “three warfares” (legal, media and psychological operations).

Further insurgents and some terrorist groups have historically used the instruments of law and dispute resolution to achieve legitimacy and control. There are several successful examples of this, most notably the Irish War of Independence (1919–1921) which in fact took some of its inspiration from Hungarian examples of the 19th century. More recently, the ISAF Coalition had no answer to the Taliban’s courts. We see a similar approach being played out today by the Islamic State. It is this aspect which will be looked at most closely.

Yet, there is nothing new or especially threatening about the use of law as a rhetorical instrument of policy, so long as it is fully realised that this is what is happening and appropriate countermeasures are adopted.

VIKTOR MARSAI (Hungary): The Improving TTPs of Al-Shabaab in Somalia – The New Ways of Asymmetric Warfare in East Africa

Al-Shabaab is the most significant Jihadist guerrilla/terrorist organization in East Africa. The group was established in 2005, and in the last eleven years it conducted devastating attacks against the troops of the Somali National Army (SNA), Police, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and state institutions. With the exception of the ISAF, AMISOM is the bloodiest crisis-management operation of the 21st century.

Since 2005 al-Shabaab has suffered severe casualties and setbacks. It lost thousands of warriors, huge territories, and its two leaders in U.S. airstrikes. In 2013 the emir of the organization, Abu Zubeyr Godane conducted a purge which also shook the organization. In 2015 the emergence of Islamic State affiliates around the Horn of Africa meant another challenge. Nevertheless, al-Shabaab has been able to change its tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) and adopt new methods to cope with the threats. It has remained one of – if not *the* – most powerful actors in Somalia. It is flexible and can transform itself within months. Despite setbacks it has the capacity to shape the political and security processes around the Horn, and jeopardize the state building efforts in Somalia.

The aims of the presentation are to analyse the improving TTPs of al-Shabaab, examine why the group is so flexible and adaptive, and explain why its enemies' methods are inadequate to cope with the organisation.

The main findings are that the group is the most unified actor in Somali politics; unlike its opponents, it has clear aims; its structure is well-established, and its leadership is open-minded and pragmatist. Due to these facts, the current methods and practices of AMISOM and SNA are not satisfactory to defeat the organisation. Therefore, al-Shabaab will remain a significant threat on the wider Horn of Africa region.

The stability of the Horn is a priority for the EU. To that end it has three concurrent missions in Somalia. If we do not want to play a prolonged and costly role in the region, we have to understand the nature of al-Shabaab and encourage AMISOM and SNA to adopt new practices. EU is the biggest financial contributor of AMISOM and the Somali government, so it has the potential to force changing methods.

The research methodology consisted of field-trips and interviews in Somalia, Ethiopia and Kenya, as well as analysis of articles, papers, and books.

SHRUTI PANDALAI (India): Strategic Communication in the Age of 'Instant Warfare': The Social Media Challenge to India's National Security

"The internet is the largest experiment involving anarchy in history. (...) It is a source for tremendous good and potentially dreadful evil, and we are only just beginning to witness its impact on the world stage," according to Google's Eric Schmidt and Jared Cohen in their book *The New Digital Age*. In this internet of everything disruption is the norm. Social media is one such disruption, which has revolutionised the way information is exchanged in real time. It has challenged information hierarchies, opened up access and produced a new information exchange ecosystem with unprecedented reach, visibility and impact. Despite its many advantages for participative governance, technology is a double edged sword. Its misuse throws up challenges in the realm of law and order and national security. India has been no exception, with 143 of its 371 million mobile internet users, actively engaged in social media.

In recent years, with the 'India against Corruption' Movement and the outrage against the horrific Delhi gang rape incident of 2012, India has witnessed the potential of the social media to coordinate large scale protests. Social media manipulation incited the 2012 ethnic riots in Assam and triggered a mass exodus of North-Eastern Indians from large parts of India. In September 2013, a morphed video on YouTube fanned communal riots in Muzaffarnagar in Uttar Pradesh and led to mass panic. The challenges to internal security have been amplified with the blatant use of social media for the radicalization of youth by terror groups like the Islamic State and their sympathizers in India. These challenges have exposed the untamed nature of the beast, a potent tool playing into the hands of anti-national elements in the absence of effective counter-measures and counter narratives.

This paper draws on the author's work on the subject for the last three years for the Government of India's Ministry of Home Affairs and The National Security Council which had commissioned projects to study 'The Impact of the Rise of Social Media on National Security'. It will evaluate perceptions, current capacities and challenges faced by security

agencies in India, grappling with the phenomenon of social media based on case studies and primary interviews. The aim is to identify future obstacles including legal challenges and recommends frameworks and best practices which would make social media a force multiplier for security and law enforcement agencies.

Social media's capacity to spread information at extremely high volumes and velocities needs to be tapped into by national security agencies to wrest control back from perpetrators of crimes. *The answer lies not in blocking the medium, but within the medium itself which provides avenues for engagement, connectedness, and collaboration and can double up as reservoir of open source intelligence if used to its optimal potential.* The paper will focus on India's experience in handling these emerging challenges to national security and hopes to open up a debate on global experiences.

ISTVÁN RESPERGER (Hungary): Asymmetric/Hybrid Operations (A/HO) and Counter-Hybrid Operations (CHO)

The paper sorts out and organizes the notions related to asymmetric/hybrid operations, in order to identify the characteristics of the complex operating environment, and to recommend possible responses to asymmetric/hybrid operations.

The warfare of our times is characterized by asymmetry and by an operating environment where the initiative for violence is largely in the hands of non-state actors on the territory of failed states. It would be more relevant to characterize this type of operating environment as hybrid and complex (rather than solely the operations themselves), considering the large number of actors involved (regular forces, irregular armed groups, organized crime, terrorist groups, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, the civilian population, *internally displaced persons*, refugees).

When defining the concepts the paper stays close to the premise set forth by Carl von Clausewitz in his work *On War*: "war is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will." In order to identify possible responses we must bear this in mind, rather than focus purely on the symptoms on the surface.

Asymmetric operations can be defined as a well-defined combat style, especially on the tactical level, to achieve a well-defined political goal, which is often waged by the coalitions of multiple organizations which have a shared ideological, religious or ethnic background. Asymmetric warfare includes military and non-military operations, methods and procedures which have direct and indirect consequences and the intention of those waging such warfare is that the effects of these actions should strengthen each other and threaten multiple dimensions of security at the same time to achieve the end goal of forcing our will upon the our enemy. The goal of the belligerent engaged in asymmetric operations is to make the enemy's position untenable, among others in order to force the occupying power to retreat and to compel its will upon it. Thus, victory may be dependent on the capability to implement the own considerations in a consequent manner.

The paper *highlights indicators* relevant to operations (diplomatic, military, military diplomatic, national security, economic, information operations, cyber-space, psychological, special operations, logistics, and civil-military cooperation). The indicators *may be* important in developing a catalogue of possible national responses and solutions through

an assessment based on a network-centric operational management. The indicators are to be categorized according to radar assessment methodology as either strategic, operational or tactical, as well as according to the threat they may potentially pose (low, medium, high, and very high) and their probability (low, medium, high, very high).

In sum, the identification of indicators can, together with the national catalogue, serve as a relevant basis for decision-makers in selecting possible counter-measures to hybrid warfare. It would also lay down the cornerstones of a counter-hybrid doctrine for the Hungarian Defence Forces.

LUNA SHAMIEH (Palestine): Asymmetric Warfare and its Effect on the Neighboring Countries – Syria Crisis as a Case Study

Asymmetric warfare does not only affect the country under asymmetric war but also highly affects the neighboring countries. Massive migration affects the neighboring countries depending on the local policies, it also affects possible creation of insurgency in the host communities.

This article identifies the effect of the Syrian crisis on the neighboring countries including Lebanon, Iraq, Turkey and Jordan. Since the civil war started in Syria, neighboring countries have been receiving hundreds of thousands of refugees that are in need of support and humanitarian assistance. The huge influx led to a high per capita concentration of refugees in Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey, with more than 3.5 million refugees. The article provides a description of the influx of migration including statistics and policies of the host communities. The article not only shows that massive migration forms a high burden on the host communities causing conflict between migrants and the host communities, but also that the lack of human security among the migrants leads to conflict and violence that affects the community as a whole, which would be the start of new insurgency in the neighboring countries.

The article shows that despite the humanitarian interventions and the inter-agency response, the socioeconomic vulnerability is still lagging behind. As the displacement and the influx of refugees are increasing so is their socioeconomic vulnerability. It shows that the lack of political security of the refugees in the neighboring countries is the core reason behind their lack of human security.

The research is based on a desk review along with field studies and focus groups conducted with refugees in the four targeted countries, to help identify status of human security amongst the refugees themselves, their communities, among the host communities, and between the migrants and the host communities.

KALE'AB TADESSE SIGATU (Ethiopia): Asymmetric Warfare against the Islamic Militant Group al-Shabaab in Somalia – The Ethiopian Experience

Ethiopia has been fighting the Islamist militant groups longer than other countries in the Horn of Africa. After Somalia became a failed state al-Shabaab's precursor, al-Ittihad al-Islami, launched a number of border region attacks. In 2006, in order to support the Tran-

sitional Federal Government, Ethiopian forces entered Somalia to oust the Islamic Courts Union that had seized control of large swaths of the country. Ethiopia withdrew its troops in 2009, after defeating the ICU, but in 2014 its forces returned as part of AMISOM, the African Union's peacekeeping force in Somalia.

Al-Shabaab, a Somali Al-Qaeda linked militant Islamist organization carried out a number of attacks in East Africa (148 students killed at Garissa University College in Kenya in 2015, 74 people killed in a suicide bombing in Uganda in 2010; the first suicide bombing in Djibouti's history in 2014; and in 2015, 10 people arrested in Tanzania, carrying explosives, detonators and an al-Shabaab flag). In the meantime, in Ethiopia, a country with a longer history of military involvement in Somalia and a much longer border with the country than Kenya, the number of al-Shabaab attacks has been zero. The last attempted attack in the country took place in 2013 and ended when two would-be suicide bombers blew themselves up in their safe house in the capital of Addis Ababa.

This presentation describes Ethiopia's methods and the instrument of state power deployed to tackle this group inside its own territory and in Somalia: a military intelligence system, a buffer zone along the Somalian border, training militias against the Islamists, and military operations inside Somalia as part of AMISOM, which weakened al-Shabaab and led to its loss of most of its territories to UN-recognized government of Somalia. The presentation also looks at the partnership between Ethiopia and the United States government, which is Ethiopia's largest provider of foreign aid and a strategic partner in counterterrorism efforts in the Horn of Africa.

The study is a desk study, mainly based on secondary data analysis of the available secondary information and documentary examinations of field reports of Ethiopian National Defense Force. News materials, as well as existing academic literature, books, research findings, and other sources will also be used.

BALINT SOMKUTI (Hungary): Irregular warfare – Time, Space, Information and Terminology

To think outside the box has become compulsory for practical and theoretical experts of irregular warfare alike. As the terminology implies this kind of warfare is not the common way of waging war for most westerners, for most of us.

This presentation deals with the issue of little wars from a dual perspective. On the one hand it provides a short summary of the complex environment of less known, or often overlooked irregular conflicts and draws the necessary conclusions, as well as compares these case studies with the criteria of a successful state run military and political campaign to quell them. These are the Maccabean Revolt in Judea 2nd c. BC, the Bagaudae movement 3–5 c. AD, the Herero uprising 1904–1905 and the Cathar movement 13 c. AD.

On the other hand it reflects on contemporary events and trends. Since in the age of globalized interconnectivity conventional warfare is getting more and more costly both financially and politically, other solutions of interest advancement is becoming more and more prominent. Therefore, the significance of non-conventional solutions and means has been growing steadily. Similarly to the cumulative effect of significant technological, ideological, economic, and social changes, irregular warfare has also undergone radical changes. Due to

the above the scientific community has been unable to come up with a precise definition of these phenomena so far, even though the evaluation of the crisis which ensued after the termination of high intensity operations in Iraq and Afghanistan has already been carried out.

Have we entered the age of hybrid or non-linear war? Is popular support more important now than military strength? What is the role of secondary identities? How can the state or the insurgents shape the narrative? Will the future battlefield be predominantly urban? In the second half of the presentation all of the above questions will be answered even though not all answers will give us reassurance.

ILONA SZUHAI (Hungary): Terrorism, Migration and Women

During my research on foreign fighters who joined the Islamic State (ISIS), I have paid attention to the relation between women and terrorism as the flow of foreigners to Syria and Iraq is unique not only for the increasing number but the significant proportion of women. The so called Islamic State (IS) has successfully increased the recruitment of women internationally. Therefore, 2015 was not only the year of migrants but the year of the “Western women” who joined terrorist organisations, particularly the IS. The girls supporting the Caliphate migrated to the territory of the Islamic State. Despite of the brutal and violent pictures linked to the terrorist organisation, there are many women who made their own decision to join the organisation and voluntarily accept the ideology and rules of the group. However, the women who joined IS do not fit into the “foreign fighters” category as the IS does not allow women to participate in fighting. Consequently, the Institute for Strategic Dialogue does not call those women foreign fighters but “female migrants”. The aim of the study is to explain the problem that women should not only be perceived as the victims of violent extremism but its perpetrators as well. Terrorist organisations exploit the weak points of law enforcement strategies and the social stereotypes so they adopt their methods accordingly in order to gain advantages. Generally, counter-terrorism strategies are built on masculine gender profiles, ignoring women as equal threats.

I have analysed the documents in the Hungarian and international literature which introduce the complex pull factors besides the effects of the general gender stereotypes and which outline the difficulties in establishing the profile of a woman affiliated with IS.

Based on the hypothesis that the women who joined the terrorist organisations had made their own decisions as individual persons in aware of the impact and consequences of their activities, I will show some possible evidence that the role of women in IS’s strategy is in transition. On the one hand, the recruitment of women to the territories controlled by the Islamic State in more countries is the part of the state building strategy, the expansion of the Caliphate. This outlines new migratory patterns as Western women not only travelled to Syria and Iraq but directly to Libya as well. On the other hand, there were cases where IS affiliated women committed or prepared for committing terrorist acts.

As a conclusion, it can be confirmed that the conflict of the future could be that not only the female migrants of IS and the returning IS women pose threat to Western cities but those who remained in Europe, who were prevented from going to Syria. Those women could be individual perpetrators rather than “just” jihadi-brides.

GERGELY TÓTH (Hungary): The Concept of the Responsibility to Protect as a Source of Asymmetric Armed Conflicts

The term Responsibility to Protect (R2P) since 2001 came to describe a highly debated new concept in international law that was developed in response to mass atrocities occurring during the 1990s. UN initiatives, followed by the work of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) led to the adoption of paragraphs 138–139 of the UN World Summit Outcome Document (2005) that laid the foundation for R2P. The UN Security Council endorsed the idea in Resolution 1674 (2006), and since then, it has applied it several times (Libya, Cote d'Ivoire, Yemen, South Sudan). However, the case of Georgia and Syria also pointed out some of the weaknesses of the theory, especially when it comes to the *ultima ratio* of measures, military intervention.

R2P seeks to balance the concept of sovereignty, emphasizing the positive obligations that arise towards the population, not only the negative requirement of non-intervention. It aims primarily to assist the sovereign in fulfilling its duties, and uses coercive measures only if no other means are available. However, there is no clear threshold for the use of military force, since such recommendations of the ICISS panel has not been accepted by states.

R2P belongs to the realm of *ius ad bellum* and therefore does not deal with the way armed conflicts are waged, however, it is one of the most often used justifications for entering into conflicts that become asymmetric, as the intervener is usually clearly stronger in classic military terms than the subject of the intervention. Also, as R2P implies a gradual escalation of force, it is likely to develop situations when a non-symmetric conflict between parties takes place, at least at a certain stage of the conflict.

The problems above led to the states' divergent understanding of R2P, and some negative and positive examples of the application of the concept. Future applications and decisions will determine the exact nature (and future) of R2P. In this light it is worth examining the recent experiences in Syria and Iraq, especially the problems associated with asymmetric warfare weakening the effectiveness of humanitarian intervention, thus undermining the legitimacy of R2P.

SRDJA TRIFKOVIC (Serbia): Demographic Jihad as a Weapon of Asymmetric Warfare

The Western world in general, and Europe in particular, are threatened not only by a small, overtly jihadist elite engaging in terrorism, but – more importantly – by a demographically vibrant, ideologically highly developed, yet decentralized, structurally amorphous Islamic movement. It has global proportions and scripturally ordained unlimited ambitions. The contemporary upsurge of *Islam as an ideology and a blueprint for political action* is a phenomenon that cannot be compared in dynamism, energy, and potential consequences with any other creed or dogma. It relies on demography as a paradigmatic tool of asymmetric warfare in order to achieve long-term geopolitical results unattainable by other means. The threat is real. It demands cool-headed diagnosis and a sustained response.

“One day millions of men will leave the southern hemisphere of this planet to burst upon the northern one,” Algerian President Boumedienne stated in his address to the UN

General Assembly in 1974. “They will burst in to conquer, and they will conquer by populating it with their children. Victory will come to us from the wombs of our women.” The ensuing half-century has produced a host of phenomena of world-historical significance which seem like that exultant prophecy is being fulfilled. I will argue that the process is not spontaneous. Terrorist attacks are carried out mostly by non-state actors, while migratory flows and radicalization of the Muslim diaspora in the West have the appearance of spontaneity; but both have been systematically encouraged and facilitated by Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and other less significant state actors.

The purpose of my paper is to make a contribution to the diagnosis of the threat, and to propose a rational strategy for countering it. The task has three key elements.

It is essential to define and understand the nature of the threat by examining Islam’s history and dogma. It is time to reject any *a priori* judgment by those who presume to know the “correct” answer regardless of the evidence. That straightjacket has to be discarded because the survival of the European culture and civilization is at stake. I will point out that the sacred texts of Islam, its record of interaction with other societies, and the personality of its founder provide the clue to the motives, ambitions and methods of its contemporary strategists.

The second task is to survey the defenses. Both in America and in Europe the elite class deems such questions about the nature of Islam illegitimate. On both sides of the ocean there also exists an elite consensus that open immigration, multiculturalism, and the existence of an ever-growing Muslim diaspora *within* the Western world are to be treated as a fixed given and must not be treated as problematic. That elite consensus, I shall contend, is ideological in nature, flawed in logic, totalitarian in application, and disastrous in results. It needs to be tested against evidence, not against the alleged norms of acceptable public discourse imposed by those who have created the problem in the first place. A related task is to re-think U.S. foreign and military policies and to warn against the absence of a coherent grand strategy, especially in the Middle East.

As for the countermeasures, the focus has been on the institutional failures of the intelligence community and government agencies rather than the culture of the decision-making community that makes failure likely. Above all, *operational effectiveness* must no longer be confused with strategy itself. The impact of the ongoing Muslim migratory influx into the developed world, and the consequences of the ever-growing Muslim diaspora, is inseparable from the coherent long-term defense of the homeland. Controlling the borders is only the first step. The application of clearly defined criteria in deciding who will be admitted into the country is essential. To that end, it will be argued, “Islamic activism” needs to be treated as an *eminently political*, rather than “religious” activity.

Civilizational renewal is the essential prerequisite for all of the above. The victory ultimately has to be won in the domain of culture. It can be won only by the West – and above all Europe – that has regained its awareness of its moral, spiritual, and civilizational roots. While the likelihood of belated recovery remains in doubt, I will conclude by offering evidence that it is not impossible.

DAVID VOGEL (Hungary): Alternative approaches to terrorism – Colombia and Peru

When talking about terrorism and the challenge for humanity in finding the answer for it, we usually think of a global solution, with multiple international players. By all means, this is usually a very efficient way to act upon this phenomena. On the other hand, local actors, governments should have a solution at hand in order to face this asymmetric threat. The study aims to examine this question through case studies of two Latin American countries: the *rondas campesinas* of Peru, and the *soldados de mi pueblo* of the neighbouring Colombia.

In the first case, Sendero Luminoso – officially the Partido Comunista del Perú – Sendero Luminoso (PCP-SL) – the Shining Path having shifted from its original Marxist-Leninist-Maoist ideological grounds of the 1980's became a real security threat for the state of Peru. Gaining control over approximately half of the country's territory, including the capital city, Lima, and turning over to drug trafficking and other organised crimes made the organisation lose most of its public support it previously had so becoming not just a central government concern, but public enemy number one from the population's point of view as well.

The second case, the example of an also Marxist-Leninist terrorist organisation, originating from an even earlier period, thus being active for more than half a century, Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército del Pueblo, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People's Army or FARC in short, made an even greater entity inside Colombia. Decades under different governments with various approaches tried to tackle the challenges of this powerful organisation that was once supported by local Colombians, although as of today the majority of the voters did not support the much-desired peace between the government and FARC merely because they found the document too easy on the terrorists.

The two situations have several things in common, and during the years, they were often treated the same way. The study's aim is to examine the answers given to the threats posed by SL and FARC by the governments of Peru and Colombia, focusing mostly on the use of militias as a tool. The *rondas campesinas* of Peru and the *soldados de mi pueblo* in Colombia represented two quite similar approaches to two quite similar problems but ended up in a totally different way both for the initiators and also for the terrorist organisations.

Closing Address by BG ATTILA TAKÁCS, Hungarian Defence Forces

The last 25 years have transformed warfare, and brought about a unique combination of old, traditional capabilities and the possibilities offered by rapid technological developments. Previous conferences have touched upon this. The Hungarian Defence Forces met with post-modern military challenges first in August 2015, during the migration crisis. This experience prompted the creation of the Military Administration and Training Command. One of the most important tasks of the Command is to execute the transformation tasks confronting the Hungarian Defence Forces. It is not by accident that the General Staff's Research Center became part of the new organization: transformation implies an adaptation and organizational development process, and the Center is one of the driving forces of this process.

When the research center's organizers began to plan this conference in the late spring of this year, they made some key decisions. First, instead of inviting speakers by name, they sent out a call for papers to think tanks, research institutes, as well as to military and police organizations. This way they opened the door to many more authors than would have been the case otherwise. Second, in order to stimulate debate and reflect the "whole of society" nature of asymmetric conflict, they made a conscious effort to pull together military and police professionals, scholars of various social science disciplines, legal experts, public administration figures, and young researchers at the beginning of their scientific career. Third, they set aside sufficient time for the panels to sum up their work in a handful of bullet points, as well as come up with a set of policy recommendations for the decision makers. This was all somewhat unusual.

Seeing the conference conclusions and recommendations, it looks like the idea of putting practitioners and scholars together has paid off. The soldiers, policemen, lawyers, administrators, sociologists, psychologists and other scientists came up with results that would not have been possible if only one discipline had been represented. The final results speak for themselves.

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During the last seven decades the state's increasing vulnerability to the challenge of non-state belligerents has been the paradox of armed conflict. In this new operational environment the firepower of the state's conventional forces and the traditional national security methods are generally ineffective against the opponent's agility, determination and strategic communication skills. The Scientific Research Centre of the General Staff of the Hungarian Defence Forces organized the Asymmetric Warfare conference in order to discuss these developments and seek answers to the questions that the asymmetric challenge poses. The conference participants – military and law-enforcement professionals, specialists in public administration, strategic communication, and international law, as well as academic researchers of various disciplines – collected their conclusions in this small volume, and recommend it to the attention of policy makers, as well as fellow professionals.

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